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ABSTRACT
There is a pervasive assumption that low latency access to an ex-
change is a key factor in the profitability of many high-frequency
trading strategies. This belief is evidenced by the “arms race” under-
taken by certain financial firms to co-locate with exchange servers.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to validate and
quantify this assumption in a continuous double auction market
with a single exchange similar to the New York Stock Exchange. It
is not feasible to conduct this exploration with historical data in
which trader identity and location are not reported. Accordingly, we
investigate the relationship between latency of access to order book
information and profitability of trading strategies exploiting that in-
formation with an agent-based interactive discrete event simulation
in which thousands of agents pursue archetypal trading strategies.
We introduce experimental traders pursuing a low-latency order
book imbalance (OBI) strategy in a controlled manner across thou-
sands of simulated trading days, and analyze OBI trader profit while
varying distance (latency) from the exchange. Our experiments sup-
port that latency is inversely related to profit for the OBI traders,
but more interestingly show that latency rank, rather than absolute
magnitude, is the key factor in allocating returns among agents
pursuing a similar strategy.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is commonly understood that execution speed is essential for a
successful high-frequency trading (HFT) strategy. InHigh Frequency
Trading: A Practical Guide, Irene Aldridge observes that “High-
frequency trading relies on fast, almost instantaneous, execution
of orders” and that “even a secondâĂŹs worth of delay induced
by hesitation or distraction on the part of a human trader can
substantially reduce the systemâĂŹs profitability” [1]. Although
there is a well-developed body of financial literature around such
strategies, works that rely on analysis of historical market data
cannot reliably quantify the precise, continuous benefit of specific
latency levels to a strategy. Publicly available market information
does not identify individual actors or provide a mechanism to reveal
the latency of an actor’s order execution after a trading decision
has been reached, so it is not feasible to use such data to infer the
importance of latency for such strategies.
To address this problem, we employ an agent-based interactive
discrete event simulation to construct a market with nanosecond
precision to fully account for agent computational delay and com-
munication latency. We experiment within that simulated market
to assess the effect of low latency on overall agent returns for a
typical high-frequency strategy. As far as we know, this is the first
published study to directly and quantitatively assess the impact of
variable latency on a trader’s profit.
Our work specifically focuses on market microstructure, or mak-
ing short-term directional trading decisions based on observed
quotes. Richard Lyons divides this group of High Frequency Trad-
ing (HFT) strategies in two sets [16], both relating to mismatches
in supply and demand:
• Inventory effects pertaining to a market maker absorbing
inventory and attempting to dissipate risk.
• Portfolio balance effects in which the order flow produces
a more lasting impact.
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We introduce a group of experimental agents following a strategy
from the first category, inventory effects, and investigate the effect
of absolute and relative latency on the profitability of each such
agent.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Our work draws from prior lines of financial research in market
microstructure trading and latency arbitrage, and computational
research in discrete event simulation and agent-based modeling.
Here we describe some of the important prior work in each area.
2.1 Market Microstructure Trading
Lawrence Harris described three types of stylized traders relevant
to market microstructure trading: [7]
(1) Liquidity traders are uninformed traders whose execution
timelines are externally motivated by a client demand or a
need to modify cash holdings.
(2) Informed traders are those who have specific, private in-
formation they believe correlates with short term price move-
ment, which must be acted on quickly.
(3) Value-motivated traders have an exogenous opinion on a
stock’s true worth and are motivated to buy or sell at specific
prices that represent significant deviations from that value.
Harris further identifies informed traders as aggressive, utilizing
market orders or limit orders near the spread to ensure their private
information is monetized before its expiration. Value-motivated
traders are characterized as more passive, placing limit orders far
from the spread to execute only if the order flow reaches their
notion of a fair price.
Our study includes simulated versions of these three stylized
strategies. We construct an environment of informed traders and
value-motivated traders that serve as “background” market agents
then, under various conditions, evaluate the performance of a par-
ticular kind of liquidity trader which attempts to predict short-term
price changes using an order book imbalance (OBI) indicator.
Bloomfield et al constructed experimental markets to test some
of Harris’s predictions, finding that informed traders take liquidity
when the gap between current prices and those suggested by their
time-sensitive information is high, but provide liquidity when that
gap is low [3]. This provides empirical support for our simulated
liquidity traders’ belief that a large amount of liquidity provision
near the spread indicates impending directional movement.
2.2 Latency Arbitrage
Wah and Wellman have previously studied latency arbitrage with
a simulated two-market model plus public price quotes from an
NBBO (National Best Bid and Offer) provider [22]. They found that
the presence of a high frequency trading (HFT) agent arbitraging
the two markets negatively impacted the surplus achieved by other
traders in excess of the amount it obtained for itself. The latency
arbitrageur did improve order execution speed (a common defense
of HFT activity) but actually caused a wider bid-ask spread.
Our work examines a different aspect of latency arbitrage, in-
troducing multiple competing liquidity traders which pursue a
low-latency strategy with a single exchange. We focus on the re-
lationship between absolute and relative communication latency
levels and the profitability of each liquidity trader.
2.3 Discrete Event Simulation
We conduct our experiments in an event driven framework built
on a discrete event simulation (DES) system kernel. Under a DES
model, the system changes state only at the edges of discrete points
in time. Conventional approaches to DES are either time driven
(synchronous) or event driven (asynchronous).
In time driven (or time “stepped”) systems, progress is driven
by incrementally advancing time, which is typically represented
by a global counter. The counter is increased by a fixed amount,
the minimum resolution, and then events that have a time stamp
matching the current counter are processed. One disadvantage of
time stepped simulation is the wasting of computation time on steps
during which no activity takes place. For example, when exploring
high frequency trading (HFT), it might be important to allow agents
to act with nanosecond time resolution. If the counter is at time t
after some agent places an order, and the next agent will act just
fifty microseconds later, the system will have to sequentially check
for activity at time steps t + 1 to t + 49999 even though there will
be no state changes.
Event driven systems mitigate the wasted computation time
caused by such “idling” by changing the mechanism of time pro-
gression. Instead of incrementing a counter, the system’s simulated
time jumps to the time stamp of the next (chronologically earliest)
scheduled event. Progress through time is guaranteed under the
assumption that until the simulation ends, there will always be
some next scheduled event. Under this model, each time an agent
acts, it will schedule its next action through a priority queue in the
system kernel.
To revisit the above HFT example in the event driven context,
when an agent places an order at time t and the next agent will
act fifty microseconds later, the kernel’s event priority queue will
have time stamp t + 50000 as the first entry, and so the system time
can transition directly from t to t + 50000 with no consideration
of the time between. This can be done because the system state
changes only through agent actions, and no action is scheduled
during the skipped interval. Event driven simulation is efficient
precisely because of this feature, that all time in between state
changes is safely ignored. Event driven kernels are also amenable
to parallelization of computation that further speeds execution,
as demonstrated in Optimistic Simulation Time Warp [11] and in
Conservative Simulation [5]. DES has been widely adopted and
used to address important problems in health care [12], supply
chain management [20], manufacturing [19], and financial markets
[9, 10, 14, 22].
Both Levy et al [14] and Wellman and Wah [22] take a synchro-
nous approach to simulation, but for our larger scale experiments
we believe that an asynchronous simulation provides greater flex-
ibility and scalability. This view is shared by Jacobs et al [9, 10],
who introduced a financial simulation framework called JLMSim.
JLMSim is a discrete event simulator that incorporates trading rules
for simple strategies and reproduces the changes in the market by
executing buy and sell orders from an order book, but with the
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limitation that it does not support the implementation of complex
custom trading strategies.
2.4 Agent Based Modeling
Our system uses an agent based model (ABM), formed by a set of
autonomous agents that interact with their environment, including
other agents, to achieve their objectives. Agent based modeling and
simulation (ABMS) has been successfully employed in a variety of
application domains [17] such as social science [2], computational
economics [21], and marketing [19]. We follow prior work in the
area bymodeling a stock market based on the behavior of individual
investors [14] represented as strategic trading agents. Agent-based
financial markets have been shown to be effective for dynamic
situations in which investor behavior must change in response to
the environment [13].
Some notable agent-based simulators from the literature are
Swarm [18], MASON [15], and Player/Stage [6]. There are also
simulators like SASSY [8] that support large numbers of agents
through an optimistic parallel kernel. While our system is not a
parallel simulation kernel we draw inspiration from their design
and currently support many thousands of agents.
3 APPROACH
To test the hypothesis that lower communication latency with an
exchange will correlate with higher trading period profits for order
book imbalance (OBI) liquidity traders, we construct an agent-based
interactive discrete event simulation using components described
in Background and Related Work. The simulation provides a Kernel
which enforces the proper flow of time and through which all inter-
agent communication must occur, and the simulation environment
represents a modern electronic stock market in which numerous
strategic trading agents place bids and offers with a single exchange
agent.
Volumes
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Figure 1: Example illustrating liquidity provisioned to a
limit order book.
3.1 Market Simulation
At the core of our simulated market is an exchange agent which
accepts orders to buy (bid prices) and sell (ask prices) specified
quantities of various securities. Such orders may optionally contain
an additional limit price which prohibits transaction at any less
advantageous price for the submitting agent. Orders with a limit
price, called limit orders, may not immediately transact, and will
instead be recorded into the limit order book for the relevant security
as shown in Figure 1, to await future transaction if a matching order
should arrive. Orders without a limit price, called market orders,
have no such restriction and will always transact immediately at
the best currently available price.
As the limit order book consists of all unfulfilled orders to trans-
act a security, the limit prices and quantities of visible bid and ask
orders can be interpreted as some representation of the supply and
demand for the security at one moment in time. Measurable aspects
of the limit order book include: the spread, or the distance between
the highest bid and lowest ask price; the available liquidity, or the
total volume of shares on offer; and the distribution of that liquidity,
in particular whether it is concentrated near or far from the spread,
and whether it is significantly greater on one side of the book than
the other.
Our simulated limit order book follows an order matching pro-
cess similar to the Nasdaq exchange in the United States. That is,
an arriving order to buy will transact with the lowest priced ask
order already in the limit order book. If the arriving order is to sell,
it will transact with the highest priced bid order instead. If there
are multiple orders in the limit order book at the same price, the
oldest order will be transacted. All transactions happen at the limit
price of the order already in the limit order book, not the arriving
order.
3.2 Background Traders
Our simulated market is not a simple backtest constructed from
static historical data, but rather a dynamic and interactive one in
which many agents participate in pursuit of profit, each able to
directly impact market pricing and other agents through its actions.
To this end we employ a population of stylized strategy agents
divided into several families inspired by the work of Lawrence
Harris [7]: value-motivated traders, informed traders, and liquidity
traders. The first two represent our “background” trading popula-
tion, which we do not alter or manipulate, and the third represents
our experimental population.
Both of our representative background agent strategies obtain
noisy observations of an exogenous price-time series, sometimes
called the fundamental series, that represents the “true value” of
a stock independent of current market price fluctuations. These
observations over time influence an internal value belief that dif-
fers per agent according to the update of a Bayesian process as
constructed by Wah et al [23]. In summary, assume a background
agent, arriving at the market via a Poisson process, wakes at time t
and receives observation ot . It updates an estimate of the current
fundamental value r˜t and that estimate’s variance σ˜ 2t :
r˜t ′ ← (1 − (1 − κ)δ )r¯ + (1 − κ)δ r˜t ′ (1)
σ˜ 2t ′ ← (1 − κ)2δ σ˜ 2t ′ +
1 − (1 − κ)2δ
1 − (1 − κ)2 σ
2
s (2)
where t ′ is agent’s previous wake time, δ = t − t ′, κ is the funda-
mental mean reversion parameter, and σ 2s is the shock variance of
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the fundamental process. Having now accounted for intervening
time, the agent applies its new observation ot to obtain an estimate
of the current fundamental value and that estimate’s variance:
r˜t =
σ 2n
σ 2n + σ˜
2
t ′
r˜t ′ +
σ˜ 2t ′
σ 2n + σ˜
2
t ′
ot (3)
σ˜ 2t =
σ 2nσ˜
2
t ′
σ 2n + σ˜
2
t ′
(4)
where σ 2n is the agent’s observation noise. With updated estimates
r˜t and σ˜ 2t , the agent can compute rˆt , the final fundamental value
rT as estimated at current time t :
rˆt ← (1 − (1 − κ)T−t )r¯ + (1 − κ)T−t r˜t (5)
where r¯ is the fundamental mean, and random perturbations are
assumed to take on a mean value of zero. This estimate of the final
fundamental value represents the agent’s belief about what the
stock price should be at the close of the trading day. It uses this
value to inform its decisions concerning limit price, trade direction,
aggressiveness of trading posture, and so on.
Value-motivated traders tend to place limit orders away from the
spread, intending to transact only if prices reach a level consistent
with their private value beliefs plus a required level of surplus.
We represent this style of trading with a common variation of
the Zero Inteligence (ZI) trader as described by Wah et al [23],
which estimates the final fundamental value as explained above.
Each ZI trader is constructed with a random vector of incremental
private values placed on the acquisition or release of one additional
unit of stock, given the agent’s current holding, which is applied
as an offset to the estimated final fundamental value. If qmax is
the holding limit, then the preferences for trading agent i are the
elements θqi in:
Θi = (θ−qmax+1i , . . . ,θ0i ,θ1i , . . . ,θ
qmax
i ) (6)
where q is the quantity of stock currently held. Θi is drawn ran-
domly from N(0,σ 2PV ), where σ 2PV is a selected experimental pa-
rameter. The values are sorted in descending order ensuring dimin-
ishing returns on private value offsets. The ZI trader places limit
orders in a random direction (buy/sell) but selects limit prices such
that transacted orders will always produce an expected surplus to
the agent.
Informed traders are represented by a class of agents taking on
the role of an arbitrageur. These agents are broadly similar to the
ZI agents, as they also make noisy observations of a fundamental
value and construct a belief about the “true” worth of a stock. The
informed traders, however, always place a directional order that
will profit from a reversion of the order flow to the fundamental.
Based on market conditions, these agents may place orders in one
of two postures: aggressively with market orders or limit orders
that cross over the spread, or passively with limit orders that do not
cross the spread. The supply and demand information they inject
to the order flow should be predictive of short-term price moves
due to their approximately correct exogenous observations.
3.3 Experimental Traders
Liquidity traders have no opinion about the “correct” value of a
stock. They participate in anticipation of profit by observing the
order flows in the market for clues that suggest short-term price
movement arising from the market microstructure itself. We inject
a population of liquidity traders as our experimental agents of
change, observing their impact on the market, and altering their
communication latency to the exchange to understand the effect
this has on the profitability of their strategy. In keeping with the
spirit of liquidity trading, these agents are unable to observe the
exogenous price-time series (fundamental) used by the background
traders. Our specific choice of liquidity trader follows an order
book imbalance (OBI) strategy which continuously tracks what
proportion of total liquidity near the spread is on the buy side of
the limit order book:
I =
∑
b ∈B Vb∑
o∈O Vo
(7)
where B is the set of visible bid orders, O is the set of all visible
orders, andV represents the share volume of a particular order. For
example, when the indicator I = 0.5, liquidity is equally distributed
between the two sides of the book, and when I = 0.6 there is 50%
more bid than ask liquidity.
The agent enters a directional trade when I > 0.5 + H or I <
0.5 − H , where H is a configurable entry threshold, and exits the
directional trade based on a trailing stop at configurable distance
D applied to the same indicator (not the midpoint stock price). The
order book depth (level) L at which to consider liquidity provision
to be a positively-correlated signal is also a configurable parameter.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We conducted two primary experiments for analysis in this work.
Both experiments utilize a simulated market containing a single
exchange with a limit order book mechanism accepting offers to
transact shares of a single security. The experimental market is
populated with 1,000 background traders, split evenly between the
value-motivated and informed trader types described in Approach.
Every trading agent is configured with a minimum communi-
cation latency to the exchange. When a message is scheduled for
transmission, the time sent is the agent’s current time plus a de-
lay that accounts for the computational complexity of the agent’s
strategy. The time received will be scheduled for the time sent plus
the minimum communication latency plus a random factor drawn
from a realistic network “jitter” model.
For those agents requiring an exogenous price-time series, we
employed a sparse mean-reverting fundamental as described in
Byrd [4]. This mathematical series is a continuous form of the
discrete mean reverting process described in Wah et al [23] with
the addition of a second variance process which is applied at lower
frequency but greater magnitude to represent infrequent “news
shocks” that can change a trader’s belief about the proper valuation
of the stock.
We conducted a preliminary experiment in which we added ten
OBI liquidity traders, as previously described, to the background
population with random latency and no particular control, and
simulated hundreds of different market days. Figure 2 compares
the absolute latency of OBI traders to their profit at market close,
with each grey data point representing one trader’s result for one
full market day. We find a strong inverse Pearson correlation of r =
−0.775. This matches our intuition that lower latency should lead
to higher profit for this strategy. However, there is an interesting
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Figure 2: Profit vs absolute latency of liquidity (OBI) traders.
gap in the plot at low latency values, with a cluster of positive
profit agents and a cluster of negative profit agents, and virtually
no agents with profit close to zero. A desire to understand this gap
motivated the design of our two subsequent experiments.
4.1 Experiment 1: Absolute Latency with
Control
In the first experiment, the described background agents were geo-
graphically situated around the United States relative to the location
of the New York Stock Exchange. The minimum communication
latency of each individual background agent was drawn from a
uniform distribution of 21µs (roughly the other side of Manhattan)
to 13ms (around Seattle, Washington).
To the background population, we added ten order book im-
balance (OBI) liquidity traders following the previously described
indicator strategy. One liquidity trader, serving as a control, was
always placed at the minimum latency permitted to background
agents and eight were randomly distributed in the same range as
the background agents. The final liquidity trader is considered the
experimental agent for Experiment 1, for which the geographic
location (latency) is systematically varied to measure its impact on
the returns of all liquidity traders. All OBI liquidity traders used an
entry threshold of H = 0.17, a trailing stop distance of D = 0.085,
and a book depth significance parameter of L = 10.
The experiment was carried out across 600 market simulations,
with each representing a full market day from 9:30 AM to 4:00
PM at nanosecond resolution. The experimental liquidity trader
was tested for a full market day at each of thirty different levels of
latency, ranging from exchange colocation (approx. 333ns) to Seattle,
Washington (approx. 13ms). Each of twenty randommarket days (i.e.
different exogenous price-time fundamental series) were repeated
with the experimental agent varied among the thirty positions to
minimize unintended perturbations in the market process. We thus
obtained 6,000 full-day observations of the latency and profitability
relationship of an OBI liquidity trader.
Results. For this experiment, we logged the absolute latency of each
liquidity trader along with its marked-to-market profit at the end
of each trading day.
Figure 3: Profit of experimental liquidity trader for thirty
levels of absolute latency (log scale) across twenty market
days. Blue line represents fixed-latency control liquidity
trader.
Figure 3 is a box-plot representation of the relationship between
log-scale latency in nanoseconds and final profit for the single
experimental liquidity trader at each tested location. The mean
profit per tested latency is marked with a tick, the box extents
mark one standard deviation, and the whiskers mark two standard
deviations. Recall that a control liquidity trader (blue line) is always
placed at the minimum permitted latency outside of colocation in an
effort to explain the zero profit gap in the preliminary experiment.
We can see that the experimental agent is consistently profitable
when it is co-located, and performs quite poorly when far from
the exchange, consistent with the earlier result. As hoped, the
combination of a control agent and systematic latency variation
did add interpretive value beyond the preliminary experiment.
Let X be the experimental liquidity trader with latency LX and
profit PX , and C be the control liquidity trader with fixed latency
fixed latency LC and profit PC . We now note two new observations.
First, ∀LX < LC : PX ⊥ LX . That is, once the absolute latency of
the experimental trader is lower than that of the control trader, its
latency does not affect its profit. Second, as soon as LX > LC there
is an immediate transfer from PX to PC .
Discussion. These results together suggest that latency rank among
the competing liquidity agents is more significant to profit outcomes
than absolute latency values. This could explain the gap in the
preliminary plot: Depending on whether some other agent was
even closer to the exchange, a given low latency trader might see
very different results. However, we cannot support this claim based
solely on Experiment 1, because the location of the other liquidity
traders (non-experimental, non-control) on each market day is not
considered.
4.2 Experiment 2: Latency Rank
In the second experiment, ten liquidity traders were again added
to the background agent population. This time, all agents were
randomly situated with a latency ranging from exchange colocation
(333ns) to Seattle, Washington (13ms), with the intent to examine
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latency rank independent of absolute latency. Without the need
to resimulate the same market day for control, this experiment
was conducted across 600 different market days, producing again
6,000 observations of OBI liquidity trader latency and profit. The
experiment was otherwise similar to Experiment 1.
Figure 4: Profit of multiple trials with liquidity traders dis-
tributed randomly, identified by latency rank order within
each trial. Lower rank traders are closer to the exchange.
Results. For Experiment 2, the latency rank of each liquidity trader
was logged along with the marked-to-market profit at the end
of each trading day. For example, the liquidity trader closest to
the exchange on a given day would be latency rank 1, the second
closest rank 2, and so on. Absolute latency was also logged for
visualization purposes. In Figure 4, we present a box-and-whisker
plot of aggregated profit by latency rank among the OBI liquidity
agents.
Over the course of a simulated trading day, without consideration
of absolute latency, the liquidity trader closest to the exchange
receives mean and std marked-to-market profit of $2,681.04 and
$1,389.37. The second closest liquidity trader receives mean and std
profit of $-3,297.30 and $1,661.30, and the liquidity trader furthest
from the exchange received mean and std profit of $-24,473.64 and
$-6,449.97. This supports the notion that latency rank is the key
factor driving the allocation of profit within this trading strategy
population.
However, there is a potential confounding factor. It could be
the case that liquidity trader latency distributions were such that
the lowest ranked agent was also always close to the exchange in
absolute terms. A different look at the data will help to clarify this.
In Figure 5, we plot end of day profit against log-scale nanosec-
ond latency, with the addition of a zero profit line. Each point
represents one liquidity trader’s result for one simulated market
day, and each point is color-coded according to that trader’s latency
rank for that simulated market day, with red being rank 1, blue
being rank 2, and so on. Ranks 6-10 are aggregated into a single
black grouping. Because this plot shows both absolute latency and
latency rank together, we can see that the nearest liquidity trader
(red) on a given market day does well even when situated very far
from the exchange, and liquidity agents in ranks 2 and 3 perform
poorly even when relatively near the exchange.
Figure 5: Profit of multiple trials with liquidity traders dis-
tributed randomly showing ranked and absolute latency.
Discussion. Taking Figures 4 and 5 together, we can clearly state
that: The liquidity trader closest to the exchange rarely loses money,
and the second closest liquidity trader rarely makes money, regard-
less of their absolute distance from the exchange.
Our initial concern regarding the preliminary experiment’s zero-
profit gap proved correct. While there was a strong inverse correla-
tion between absolute latency and profit, this was not the primary
factor influencing strategy returns. Profitability was rather deter-
mined by the ordinal latency rank among agents pursuing a similar
low-latency strategy.
CONCLUSION
Using a realistic agent based market simulation, we explored the
effect of latency on the profitability of a strategy that depends on
perishable information. We constructed an environment consisting
of thousands of background trading agents into which we could in-
ject low latency liquidity traders acting on an order book imbalance
indicator.
Through a preliminary experiment, we observed a strong in-
verse correlation between the absolute latency and profitability of
liquidity traders. We systematically investigated this through two
controlled experiments and found that the result of the preliminary
experiment was not sufficiently explanatory. While the correlation
is real, the actual determining factor in profitability was the ordinal
rank of latency among the population of liquidity traders.
Regardless of absolute distance, we found that the closest liq-
uidity trader was substantially more profitable than agents even
slightly further away, and was the only consistently net profitable
liquidity trader. These observed winner-take-all outcomes among
traders pursuing the same time-sensitive strategy would seem to
justify the apparent “arms race” to achieve the minimum possible
latency to an exchange when engaging in market microstructure
trading.
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